

Monday, 10 September

Acting

1. Met with Bundy, Rusk, McNamara, Taylor and the Attorney General in McGeorge Bundy's office at approximately 5:45 in a meeting generated by Secretary Rusk's concern over Cuban overflights and his particular desire to avoid any incidents. (See attachments)

Earlier this day Bundy through Tom Parrott requested information on inquiries posed by Mr. Rusk on the importance of our intelligence objectives necessitating Cuban overflights; how much intelligence would suffer if reconnaissance were limited to peripheral flights; and an engaging question whether anyone in the Community might wish to provoke an incident. (See attachment)

2. Sent Secretary of Defense a memorandum on "Tactical Reconnaissance of Cuba" indicating COMOR's recommendation and DIA's request for the following needs:
 - a. Coverage of Banes as a possible surface-to-air missile site;
 - b. Need for larger scale coverage of Banes than can be acquired by the U-2; and
 - c. Recommended Secretary of Defense initiate necessary action for tactical type reconnaissance of Banes or other targets as identified by COMOR. (See attachment)
3. At President's instruction briefed General Eisenhower on Cuban situation.
4. DCI Cable urging BNE to study motives behind Cuban defense measures which might be designed to hide installation of offensive capability. DD/I notified.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

*Signed
in
10 Sept.*

copies to

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10 Sept 62

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Tactical Reconnaissance of Cuba

1. At an executive session of the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) held on 8 September 1962, and at the request of the Defense Intelligence Agency representative, the need for conducting tactical reconnaissance of Cuba was discussed and the following conclusions reached.

2. The facility near Banes, Cuba (205850N/753815W) initially described by the National Photographic Interpretation Center as a possible surface-to-air missile site needs additional coverage. It is considered by the COMOR that at this time this specific objective is by itself the highest priority for satisfaction by photo reconnaissance means.

3. In order to establish the exact function and the operational characteristics of this facility, it is the conclusion of COMOR that this target will almost certainly in the near future require photography of a larger scale than can be acquired by the U-2.

4. ^{Security} It is recommended that you initiate the necessary action (including Special Group approval) to provide for the employment, when directed by higher authority, of tactical-type reconnaissance against Banes or other targets as are identified in COMOR-D-24/15, which was made available to DIA on 1 September 1962.

/s/
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director

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*cc
DIA
ch. Sec
Div. DIA*

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C-O-P-Y

COMOR-D-24/16

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(signed)

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director

Copy 1--Sec. of Defense
2--Chief of Staffs
3--Dir/NRO

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